This is a large change in the terms of relations: subordination is becoming (although between grossly unequal parties) negotiation
The eighteenth century witnessed a qualitative change in labor relations whose nature is obscured if we see it only in terms of an increase in the scale and volume of manufacture and trade. This occurred, of course. But it occurred in such a way that a substantial proportion of the labor force actually became more free from discipline in their daily work, more free to choose between employers and between work and leisure, less situated in a position of dependence in their whole way of life, than ffiey had been before or than they were to be in the first decades of the discipline of the factory and of the clock.
This was a transitory phase, with three prominent features. First was the loss of non-monetary usages or perquisites, or their translation into money payments. Such usages were still extraordinarily pervasive in the early eighteenth century. They favored paternal social control because they appeared simultaneously as economic and as social relations, as relations between men not as payments for services or things. Most evidently, to eat at oness employer's board, to lodge in his barn or above his workshop, was to submit to his supervision. In the great house the servants who were dependent upon "vails" from visitors, the clothing of the mistress, the clandestine perquisites of the surplus of the larder, spent a lifetime ingratiating favors. In the unenclosed village, access to common rights depended partly upon expressed status wiiin the social economy (whether a copyholder or cottager), partly upon unexpressed or informal status-a laborer who had won the good opinion of neighbors and who was llnlikely to fall on the poor rates was more likely to get away with erecting a cottage at the roadside or grazing the odd beast where he had no statutory "right." Even the multiform perquisites within industry increasingly being redefined as "theft," were more likely to starvive where the workers accepted them as favors and submitted to a filial dependency. In such ways economic rationalization nibbled (and had long been nibbling) through the bonds of paternalism. The other leading feature of this transitional period was of course the enlargement of that sector of the economy which was independent of a subject relationship to the gentry. Ihe "subject" economy remained huge: not only the direct retainers of the great house, the chambermaids and footmen, coachmen and grooms and gardeners, the gamekeepers and laundresses, but the further concentric rings of economic clientship-the equestrian trades and luxury trades, the dressmakers and pastry cooks and vintners, the coach makers, the innkeepers and ostlers.
But the century saw a growing area of independence within which the small employers and laborers felt their client relationship to the gentry very little or not at all. These were the people whom the gentry saw as "idle and disorderly," withdrawn from their social control; from among these-the clothing workers, urban artisans, colliers5 bargees and porters, laborers and petty dealers in the food trades-the social rebels, the food or turnpike noters, were likely to come. They retained many of the attributes commonly ascribed to "pre-industrial labor." Working often in their own cottages, owning or hiring their own tools, usually working for small employers, frequently working irregular hours and at more than one job, they had escaped from the social controls of the manorial village and were not yet subject to the discipline of factory labor.
Many of their economic dealings might be with men and women little higher in the economic hierarchy than themselves. Their "shopping" was not done in emporiums but at market stalls; and the cottager or small farmer's wives would trudge in at dawn to the market town, and set their baskets of eggs, fruit and vegetables, butter and poultry, at the side of the square. The poor state of the roads made necessary a multitude of local markets, at which exchanges of products between primary producers might still be unusually direct. In the 1760s, Hard-labouring colliers, men and women of Somersetshire and Gloucestershire, travelled to divers neighbouring towns with drifts of horses ... laden with coals.... It was common to see such colliers lade or fill a two bushel coal sack with articles of provisions. . . of beef, mutton, large half stript beef bones, stale loaves of bread, and pieces of cheese. Such markets and, even more, the seasonal fairs provided not only an economic but a cultural nexus.
In many regions, the people had not been shaken altogether from some sketchy tenure of the land. Since much industrial growth took the form, not of concentration into large units of production, but of the dispersal of petty units and of by-employments (especially spinning) there were additional resources for "independence." This independence was for many never far from mere subsistence: a bountiful harvest might bnng momentary affluence, a long wet season might throw people onto the poor rates. But it was possible for many to knit together this subsistence, from the common, from harvest and occasional manual earnings, from by-employments in the cottage, from daughters in service, from poor rates or charity. And undoubtedly some of the poor followed their own predatory economy, like "the abundance of loose, idle and disorderly persons" who were alleged, in the time of George II, to live on the margins of Enfield Chase, and who "infest the same, going in dark nights, with Axes, Saws, Bills, Carts and Horses, and in going and coming Rob honest people of their sheep, lambs and poultry...." Such persons appear again and again in criminal records, estate correspondence, pamphlet and press; they appear still, in the 1790s, in the agricultural country surveys; they cannot have been wholly a ruling-class invention. Thus the independence of labor (and small master) from clientage was fostered on the one hand by the translation of non-monetary "favors" into payments; and on the other by the extension of trade and industry on the basis of the multiplication of many small units of production, with much by-employment (especially spinning) coincident with many continuing forms of petty land tenure (or common right) and many casual demarlds for manual labor. This is an indiscriminate picture, and deliberately so. Economic historians have made many careful discriminations between different groups PATRICIAN SOCIEW, PLEBI CULTUE 387 of laborers. But these are not relevant to our present enquiry. Nor were these discriminations commonly made by commentators from among the gentry when they considered the general problem of the "insubordination" of labor. Rather, they saw beyond the park gates, beyond the railings of the London mansion, a blur of indiscipline-the "idle and disorderly," "the mob," the "populace"-and they deploredtheir open scoffings at all discipline, religious as well as civil: their contempt of all order, frequent menace to all justice, and extreme promptitude to tumultuous risings from the slightest motives.
It is, as always, an indiscriminate complaint against the populace as a whole. Free labor had brought with it a weakening of the old means of social discipline. So far from a confWldent patriarchal society, the eighteenth century sees the old paternalism at a point of crisis.
II And yet one feels that "crisis" is too strong a term. If the complaint continues throughout the century that the poor were indisciplined, cnminal, prone to tumult and riot, one never feels, before the French Revolution, that the rulers of Entand conceived that their whole social order might be endangered. The insubordination of the poor was an inconvenience; it was not a menace. The styles of politics and of architecture, the rhetoric of the gentry and their decorative arts, all seem to proclaim stability, selfconfidence, a habit of managng all threats to their hegemony.
We may of course have overstated the crisis of paternalism. In directing attention to the parasitism of the State at the top, and the erosion of traditional relations by free labor and a monetary economy at the bottom, we have overlooked intermediate levels where the older economic household controls remained strong, and we have perhaps understated the scale of the "subject" or "client" areas of the economy. The control which men of power and money still exercised over the whole life and expectations of those below them remained enormous, and if paternalism was in crisis, the industrial revolution was to show that crisis must be taken several stages further-as far as Peterloo and the Swing Riots-before it lost all credibility.
Nevertheless, the analysis allows us to see that ruling-class control in the eighteenth century was located primarily in a cultural hegemony, and only secondarily in an expression of economic or physical (military) power. To say that it was "cultural" is not to say that it was immaterial, too fragile for analysis, insubstantial. To define control in terms of cultural hegemony is not to gve up attempts at analysis, but to prepare for analysis at the points at which it should be made: into the images of power and authority, the popular mentalities of subordination.
Defoe's fictional cloth worker, called before the magistrate to account for default, offers a clue: "not my Master, and't please your Worship, I hope I am my own Master." The deference which he refuses to his employer, overflows in the calculated obsequiousness to "your Worship." He wishes to struggle free from the immediate, daily, humiliations of dependency. But the larger outlines of power, station in life, political authority appear to be as inevitable and irreversible as the earth and tlle sky. Cultural hegemony of this kind induces exactly such a state of mind in which the established structures of authority and even modes of exploitation appear to be in the very course of nature. This does not preclude resentment or even surreptitious acts of protest or revenge; it does preclude affirmative rebellion.
The gentry in eighteenth century England exercised this kind of hegemony. And they exercised it all the more effectively since the relation of ruler to ruled was very often not face-to-face but indirect. Absentee landowners, and the ever-present mediation of bailiffs apart, the emergence of the three-tier system of landowner, tenant farmer and landless laborer, meant that the rural laborers, in the mass, did not confront the gentry as employers nor were the gentry seen to be in any direct sense responsible for their conditions of life; for a son or daughter to be taken into service at the great house was seen to be, not a necessity but a favor.
And in other ways they were withdrawn from the polarities of economic and social antagonism. When the price of food rose, the popular rage feli not on the landowners but upon middlemen, forestallers, millers. The gentry might profit from the sale of wool, but they were not seen to be in a direct exploitive relation to the clothing workers.
In the growing industrial areas, the gentry J.P. frequently lived withdrawn from the main industrial centers, at his country seat and he was at pains to preserve some image of himself as arbitrator, mediator or even protector of the poor. It was a common view ffiat "wherever a tradesman is made a justice a tyrant is created." The poor laws, if harsh, were not administered directly by the gentry; where there was blame it could fall upon the poor-rate paring farmers and tradesmen from among whom the overseers came. Langborne presents the idealized paternalist picture; exhorting the country justice to We have the paradox that the credibility of the gentry as paternalists arose from the high visibility of certain of their functions, and the low visibility of others. A great part of the gentry's appropriation of the labor value of the poor was mediatDd by their tenantry, by trade or by taxation. Physically they withdrew increasingly from face-to-face relations with the people in village or town. The rage for deer parks and the threat of poachers led to the closure of rights of way across their parks and their encirclement with high palings or walls; landscape gardening, with ornamental waters and fish ponds, menageries and valuable statuary, accentuated their secretion and the defenses of their grounds, which might be entered only through the high wrought iron gates, watched over by the lodge. The great gentry were defended by their bailiffs from their tenants, and by their coachmen from casual encounters. They met the lower sort of people mainly on their own terms, and when these were clients for their favors; in the formalities of the bench; or on calculated occasions of popular patronage.
But in performing such functions their visibility was formidable, just as their formidable mansions imposed their presence, apart from, but guarding over, the village or town. Their appearances have much of the studied self-consciousness of public theatre. The sword was discarded, except for ceremonial purposes; but the elaboration of wig and powder, ornamented clothing and canes, and even the rehearsed patrician gestures and the hauteur of bearing and expression, all were designed to exhibit authority to the plebs and to exact from them deference. And with this went certain significant ritual appearances: the ritual of the hunt; the pomp of assizes (and all the theatrical style of the law courts); the segregated pews, the late entries and early departures, at church. And from time to time there were occasions for an enlarged ceremonial, which had wholly paternalist functions: the celebration of a marriage, a coming-of-age, a national festival (coronation or jubilee or naval victory), the alms-giving to the poor at a funeral.
We have here a studied and elaborate hegemonic style, a theatrical role in which the great were schooled in infancy and which they maintained until death. And if we speak of it as theater, it is not to diminish its importance. A great part of politics and law is always theater; once a social system has become "set," it does not need to be endorsed daily by exhibitions of power (although occasional punctuations of force will be made to define the limits of the system's tolerance); what matters more is a continuing theatrical style. What one remarks of the eighteenth century is elaboration of this style and the self-consciousness with which it was deployed.
The gentry and (in matters of social intercourse) their ladies judged to a nicety the kinds of conspicuous display appropriate to each rank and station: what coach, how many footmen, what table, even what proper reputation for "liberality." The show was so convincing that it has even misled historians; one notices an increasing number of references to the "paternal responsibilities" of the aristocracy, upon which "the whole system rested." But we 390 journal of social history have so far noted gestures and postures rather than actual responsibilities. The theater of the great depended not upon constant, day-by-day attention to responsibilities (except in the supreme offices of State) almost every function of the eighteenth-century aristocracy, and many of those of the higher gentry and clergy, was held as a quasi-sinecure whose duties were farmed out to subordinates) but upon occasional dramatic interventions: the roasted ox, the prizes offered for some race or sport, t:he liberal donation to charity in time of dearth, the application for mercy, the proclamation against forestallers. It is as if the illusion of paternalism was too fragile to be risked to more sustained exposure.
The occasions of aristocratic and gentry patronage certainly deserve attention: this social lubncant of gestures could only too easily make the mechanisms of power and exploitation revolve more sweetly. The poor, habituated to their irrevocable station, have often been made accessories, through their own good nature, to their own oppression; a year of short commons can be oompensated for by a liberal Christmas dole.
But such gestures were calculated to receiere a return in deference quite disproportionate to the outlay and they certainly don't merit the description of "responsibilities.' These great agrarian bourgeois ennced little sense of public, or even corporate, responsibility. The century is not noted for the scale of its public buildings but for that of its private mansions; and is as much noted for the misappropriation of the charities of previous centuries as for the founding of new ones.
One public function the gentry assumed wholly as their own: the administration of the law, the maintenance, at times of crisis of public order. At this point they became magisterially and portentously visible. Responsibility this certainly was although it was a responsibility, in the first and in the second place, to their own property and authority. With regularity and with awful solemnity the limits of tolerance of the social system were punctuated by London's hanging days; by the corpse rotting on the gibbet beside the highway; by the processional of Asslzes. However undesirable the side-effects (the apprentices and servants playing truant from service,, the festival of pickpockets, the acclamation of the condemned) the ritual of public execution was a necessary concomitant of a system of social discipline where a great deal depended upon theater.
III
If the great were wiffidrawn so much, within their parks and mansions, from public view, it follows that the plebs, in many of their activities, were withdrawn also from them. Effective paternal sway requires not only temporal but also spintual or psychic authority. It is here that we seem to find the systems weakest liS.
It would not be difficult to find, in this parish or in that, ei«teenth-century clergy fulfilling, with dedication, paternalist functions. But we know PATRICIAN SOCIETY, PLEBIAN CULTURE 391 very well that these are not characteristic men. Parson Adams is drawn, not to exemplify the practices of the clergy but to criticize them; he may be seen, at once, as the Don Quixote of ie eighteenth-century Anfiican Church. The Church was profoundly Erastian; had it performed an effective, a psycho logically compelling paternalist role, the Methodtst movement would have been neither necessary nor possible.
All this could no doubt be qualified. But what is central to our purpose is that the "magcal" command of the Church and of its rituals over the populace, while still present, was becoming very weak. In the sixteenffi and seventeenth centuries, Puritanism had set out to destroy the bonds of idolatry and superstition-the wayside shrines, the gaudy churches, the local miracle cults, the superstition practices, the confessional priesthood-which, as one may still see in Eire or in parts of southern Europe today, can hold th common people in awe. The Restoration could not restore a tissue of papist idolatry for which, in any case, England had never been notably disposed. But the Restoration did loosen the new bonds of discipline which Puntanism had brought in its place. There can be little doubt that the early eidlteenth century witnessed a great recession in Puritanism, and the diminution in the size of the popular Puritan following even ln those artisan centers which had rlourished the Cinl War sects. In the result, there was an accession of freedom, aliough of a negative kind, to the poor-a freedom from the psychic discipline and moral supervision of priesthood or of presbyters.
A pnesthood with active pastoral care has usuadly found ways of co-existing with the pagan or heretical superstitions of its flock. However deplorable such compromises may appear to ffieologians, the priest learns that many of the beliefs and practices of "folklore' are harmless; if attached to the calendar year of the Church they can be to that degree Christianized, and can serve to reinforce the Church's authority. What matters most is that the Church should in its rituals, command the rites of passage of personal life, and attach the popular festivals to its own calendar.
The Anglican Church of the eighteenth centllry was not a creature of this kmd. It was served not by priests but by parsons. It had, except in unusual nstances, abandoned the confessional. It recruited few sons of the poor into the priesthood. When so many priests served as temporal magistrates and ofElcered the sarne law as the gentry, they could scarcely present themselves convincingly as the agents of an alternative spintual authority. When bishops were political appointments, and when the cousins of the gentry were placed in country livings, where they enlarged their viarages and adopted the gentry's style of life, it was only too evident from what source the Church's authority was derived.
Above all, the Church lost command over the "leisure" of the poor, their feasts and festivals, and, with this, over a large area of plebeian culture. The term "leisure" is, of course, itself anachronistic. In rural society where small farmlng and the commons economy persisted, and in large areas of manufacturing industry, the organization of work was so varied and irregulg journal of social history 392 that it is false to make a sharp distinction between "work" and "leisure." On the one hand, social occasions were intermixed with labor-with marketing, sheep shearing and harvesting, fetching and carrying the materials of work and so on throughout the year. On the other hand, enormous emotional capital was invested, not piecemeal in a succession of Saturday nights and Sunday mornings, but in the special feasts and festival occasions. Many weeks of heavy labor and scanty diet were compensated for by the expectation (or reminiscence) of these occasions, when food and drink were abundant, courtship and every kind of social intercourse flourished, and the hardship of life was obliterated. For the young, the sexual cycle of the year turned on these festivals. These occasions were, in an important sense, what men and women lived for; and if the Church had little signiElcant part in their conduct, then it had, to iat degree, ceased to engage with the emotional calendar of the poor.
One can see this in a literal sense. While the old saints days were scattered liberally across the calendar the Church's ritual calendar concentrated events into the months of light demands upon labor, from the winter to the spring, from Christmas to Easter. While the people still owed tribute to the last two dates, which remained as days of maximum communion) the eighteenthcentury calendar of popular festivity coincides closely with the agrarian calendar. The village and town feasts for the dedication of churchesor wakes-had not only moved from the saints' days to the adjacent Sunday, but in most cases they had also been removed (where necessary) from the winter to the summer solstice. In about 1730, the antiquarian, Thomas Hearne, made a note of the feast day of 132 villages or towns in Oxfordshire or on its borders. All fell between May and December; 84 (or more than three-fifths) fell in August and September; no fewer than 43 (or almost one-third) fell in the last week of August and the fslrst week of September. Apart from a significant group of some twenty which fell between the end of June and the end of July, and which in a normal year might be expected to fall between the end of the hay harvest and the commencement of the cereal harvest, the weight of the emotional festive calendar fell in the weeks immediately after the harvest was gathered in.
Or. Malcolmson has reconstructed a calendar of feasts for Northamptonshire in the later eighteenth century which shows much the same incidence. Along with the secularization of the calendar goes a secularization of the style and the function of the occasions. If not pagan, then new secular functions were added to old ritual; the publicans, hucksters and entertainers encouraged, with their numerous stalls, the feasts when tileir customers had uncustomary harvest earnings in their pockets; the village charity and benefit clubs took over the old church ales of Whitsuntide. At Bampton WhitMonday's club feast included a procession wi drum and piper (or fiddler), morris darlcers, a clown with a bladder who carried the "treasury" (a money box'for contributions), a sword bearer with a cake. There was, of course, no crucifix, no priest or nuns, no images of virgin or saints: their absence is only unusual in pressing to the point of satire the argument that private nces were public benefits. In more softened form the same argument, as to the valuable function of luxury in providing employment and spectacle for the poor, was part of ie economic cant of the time.
Indeed, we have seen that the conspicuous display of luxury and "liberality" was part of ie theater of the great. In some areas (wages theory, the poor laws, the crlminal code), the materialism of the rich consorted without difficulty with a disciplinary control of the poor. But ln other areas-ie permissive attitude to the robust, unchristim popular culture, a certain caution and even delicacy in the handling of popular disturbance even a certain flattery extended to the poor as to their liberties and rights-in these areas we are presented with a problem which demands more subtle analysis. It suggests some reciprocity in the relations between rich and poor; an inhibition upon the use of force against indiscipline and disturbance; a caution (on the part of the nch) against taking measures which would alienate the poor too far, and (on the part of that section of the poor which from time to time rallied behind the cry of 'Chureh and King>) a sense that there were tangible advantages to be gained by soliciting the favor of the rich. There is some mutuality of relationship here whidh it is difficult not to analyze at the level of class relationship. And yet, have we not been often told that it is premature, in the eighteenth century, to speak of a ;'working class?" Of course, no one in the eighteenth century would have thought of describing their own as a "one-class society." There were the rulers and the ruled, ffie high and the low people, persons of substance and of independent estate and the loose and disorderly sort. In between, where the professionK and middle dasses, and the substantial yeomallry7 should have been, relations of dientage and dependency were so strong that, at least until the 1760s, these goups appear to offer little deflection of the essential polarities. Only someone who was "independent" of the need to defer to patrons could be thought of as havillg filll political identity: so much is a point in favor of the "one-class" view. But class does not define itself in political identity alone. A plebs is not, perhaps, a working class. The plebs may lack a consistency of self-definition, in consciousness; clarity of objectives; the structurlng of 396 journal of social history class organization. But the political presence of the plebs, or"mob," or "crowd," is manifest; it has been chronicled, for London, by George Rude; it impinged upon high politics at a score of critical occasions-Sacheverell riots, excise agitation, Cider Tax, the patriotic and chauvinistic ebullitions which supported the career of the elder Pitt) and on to Wilkes and beyond. Even when the beast seemed to be sleeping, the tetchy sensibilities of a libertarian crowd defined, in the largest sense, the limits of what was politically possible There is a sense in which rulers and crowd needed each other7 watched each other, performed theater and countertheater to each other's auditorium, moderated each other's political behavior. This is a more active and reciprocal relationship than the one normally brought to mind under the formula "paternalism and deference.' It is necessary also to go beyond the view that laboring people, at this time, were confined within the fraternal loyalties and the "vertical" consciousness of particular trades; and that this inhibited wider solidarities and "horizontal" consciousness of class. There is something in this, certainly. The urban craftsman retained something of a guild outlook; each trade had its songs (with the implements of the trade minutely described), its chapbooks and legends; some trades, like the blacksmiths and the wool combers, maintained their ritual saint's days and processions. So the shoemaker's apprentice might be given by his master 7she Delightful, Princely and EntertainingHistory of the Gentle-Craft, and there read: consciousness may inhibit is economic solidarities between different groups of producers as against their employers; but if we lay aside this anachronistic postulate, we will find among eighteenth-century workmen abundant evidence of horizontal solidarities and consciousness. In the scores of occupational lists which I have examined of food rioters, turnpike rioters, riots over libertarian issues or enclosure of urban commons, it is clear that solidarities were not segregated by trade; in a region where clothing workers, tinners or colliers are predominant, these obviously predominate in the lists of offenders, but not to the exclusion of other working occupations. I hope to have shown, in another place, that all these groups, during food riots, shared a common consciousness-ideology and objectives-as petty consumers of the necessities of life. But these people were consumers also of cultural values, of libertarian rhetoric, of patriotic prejudice; and on these issues they could exhibit solidanties as well. When, in the quiet 1750s, Princess Amelia tried to close all access to Richmond New Park, she was opposed by a vigorous horizontal consciousness which stretched from John Lewis, a wealthy local brewer, to Grub Street pamphleteers, and which embraced the whole local "populace." When, in 1799, the magistrates attempted to put down Shrove Tuesday football in the streets of Kingston, it was"the populace" and "the mob" who assembled and triumphantly defied their orders. The mob may not have been noted for an impeccable consciousness of class; but the rulers of England were in no doubt at all that it was a horizontal sort of beast.
Let us take stock of the argument to this point. It is suggested that, in practice, paternalism was as much theater and gesture as effective responsiw bility; that so far from a warm, household, face-to-face relationship we can observe a studied technique of rule. While there was no novelty in the existence of a distinct plebeian culture, with its own rituals, festivals, and superstitions, we have suggested that in the eighteenth century this culture was remarkably robust, greatly distanced from the polite culture, and that it no longer acknowledged, except in perfunctory ways, the hegemony of the Church.
This plebeian culture was not, to be sure, a revolutionary nor even a proto-revolutionary culture (in the sense of fostering ulterior objectives which called in question the social order); but one should not describe it as a deferential culture either. It bred riots but not rebellions: direct actions but not democratic organizations One notices the swiftness of the crowd's changes in mood, from passivity to mutiny to cowed obedience. We have this in the satirical ballad of the "Brave Dudley Boys": It is easy to characterize this behavior as child like. No doubt, if we insist upon looking at the eighteenth century only through the lense of the mneteenth-century Labor Movement, we will see only the immature, the pre-political the infancy of class. And from one aspect this is not untrue: repeatedly one sees pre*figurements of nineteenth-century class attitudes and organization; fleeting expressions of solidarities, in riots, in strikes) even before the gallows; it is tempting to see eighteenth-century workers as an immanent working class, whose evolution is retarded by a sense of the futility of transcending its situation. But the '4to-fro lackeying' of the crowd itself a history of great antiquity: e ;4primitive rebels" of one age might be seen from an earlier age, to be the decadent inherltors of yet more primitive axlcestors. Too much historical hindsight distracts us from seeing the crowd as it was, sui generis, with its own objectives, operating within the complex and delicate polarity of forces of its own context. I have attempted elsewhere to reconstruct these crowd objectives, and the logic of the crowd's behavior in one particular case: the food riot. I believe that all other major types of crowd acfion wS after patient analysis, reveal a siTnilar logc: it is only the short-sighted historian mrho hnds the eruptions of the crowd to be "blind*" Here I wish to discuss briefly three characteristics of 399 popular action, and then to return once again to the context of gentry-crowd relations in which all took place.
First is the anonymous tradition. The anonymous threat, or even the individual terronst act, is often found in a society of total clientage and dependency, on the other side of the medal of simulated deference. It is exactly in a rural society, where any open, identified resistance to the ruling power may result in instant retaliation-loss of home, employment, tenancy, if not victimization at law-that one tends to find the acts of darkness: the anonymous letter, arson of the stack or outhouse, houghing of cattle, the shot or bnck through the window, the gate off its hinges, the orchard felled, the fish-pond sluices opened at night. The same man who touches his forelock to the squire by day-and who goes down to history as an example of deference-may kill his sheep, snare his pheasants or poison his dogs at night.
I don't offer eighteenth-century England as a theater of daily terror. That was reserved for 3Ohn Bull's Other Island. But historians have scarcely begun to take the measure of the volume of anonymous violence. The notorious "Waltham Black Act" of 1723 arose out of exactly such a background of unusually organized actions in the forests of Hampshire and Berkshire. Successive capital statutes, spaced across the century, were in response to similar local outbreaks. And a bizarre record of the march of literacy is to be found in the columns of the London Gazette. This publication of August Authonty, in whose pages appeared the movements of the Court, promotions and commissions in the services, and ofElcial notices of every kind, there also appeared advertisements of rewards and proffered pardons. In pursuit of the authors of anonymous letters, these letters were often published in full, with their original orthography.
What these letters show is that eighteenth-century laboring men were quite capable, in the security of anonymity, of shattering any illusion of deference and of regarding their rulers in a wholly unsentimental and unfilial way. A writer from Witney, in 1767, urged the recipient: "do not suffer such damned wheesing fat guted Rogues to Starve the Poor by such Hellish ways on purpose that they may follow hunting horse racing &c and to maintain their familys in Pride and extravagance." An inhabitant of Henley on-Thames, who had seen the volunteers in action against the crowd, addressed himself to "you gentleman as you are please to call Yourselves-Altllo that is your Mistakes-for you are a sett of the most Damnable Rougs that Ever Existed." (An Odiham author, writing on a similar theme in l800, remarked "we dont care a Dam for them fellows that Call Themselves Gentlemen Soldiers But in our opinion the Look moore like Monkeys riding on Bears.") Sometimes the lack of proper deference comes through merely as a brisk aside: "Lord Buckingham," a handbill writer in Norwich remarked in 1793, "who died the other day had Thirty Thousand Pounds, yeerly For setting his Arse in the House of Lords and doing nothing."
These letters show-and they are dispersed over most parts of England, as well as parts of Wales-that deference could be very brittle indeed, and made up of one part of self-interest, one part of dissimulation, and only one part of 400 journal of social historYf the awe of authority. They were part of the countertheater of the poor. They were intended to chill the spine of gentry and magistrates and mayors recall them to their duties, enforce from them charity in times of dearth.
This takes us to a second characteristic of popular action which I have described as countertheater. Just as the rulers asserted tlleir hegemorly by a studied theatrical style, so the plebs asserted their presence by a theater of threat and sedition. From the time of WiLkes forward the language of crowd symbolism is comparatively ;'modern" and easy to read: effigy burning; the hangng of a boot from a gallows; the illumination of windows (or the breaking of those without illumination); the untiling of a house which, as RudE notes, had an almost ritualistic significance. In London the unpopular minister, the popular politician needed the aid of no pollsters to know their rating witk the crowd; they might be pelted with obscenities or chaired in triumph through the streets. Not only the condemned trod the stage at Tyburn: the audience also proclaimed vociferously their assent or disgust with the book.
But as we move backward from 1760 we enter a world of theatrical symbolism which is more difflcult to interpret: popular political sympathies are expressed in a cede quite different from that of the 1640s or of the 1790s. It is a language of ribbons of bonfslresn of oaths and of the refusal of oaths, of toasts, of seditious riddles ar3d ancient prophecies, of oak leaves and of maypoles, of ballads with a political double-entendre, even of airs whistled in the street. We dont yet know enough about popular Jacobitism to assess how much of it was sentiment, how much was substancer but we can certainly say that the plebs on many occasions employed Jacobite symbolism successfuLly as theater, knowing well that it was the script most calculated to enrage and alarm their Hanoverian rulers. In the 172Qs, when a censored press veils rather than illuminates public opinion, one detects underground moods in the vigor with which rival Hanoverian and Stuart anniversaries were celebrated. The Norwich Gazette reported in May 1723 that Tuesday lastf being the birthday of Kig Georgea was observed in the city sCwith all the usual demonstrations of joy and loyalty': Once again, one notes the sense of theater even in the full flush of rage: the symbolic destruction of the benches of justice, the Clerkss books, the Tory corporation's Stuart portraits, the mock triumph to the magistrates; and yet, with this, the order of their processions and the restraint which withheld them (even after they had been fired upon) from taking life.
Of course, the crowd lost its head as often as the mapstrates did. But the interesting point is that neither side did this often. So far from being4'blind5 the crowd was often disciplined, had clear objectives7 knew how to negotiate with authority and above all brought its strength swiftly to bear. The authorities often felt themselves to be faced literally, with an anonymous multitude "These men are all tinners,' a customs off1cer wrote from St. Austell in 1766 of local smuggling gangs? "seldom seen above grollnd in the daytime, and are under no apprehensions of being known by us.' Where "ringleaders" were detected) it was often impossible to secure sworn depositions. But solidarity rarely went further than thise If taken the leaders of the crowd might hope for an immediate rescue) within twenty-four hours, if this moment passed they could expect to be abandoned.
Other features might be noted: but these three-the anonymous tradition; countertheater; and swift, evanescent direct action-seem of importance. The tensions-between court and country, money and land-ran deep. Until 1750 or 1760 the term "gentry" is too undiscriminating for the purposes of our analysis. There is a marked divergence between the WEig and Tory traditions of relations with the crowd. The igs, in those decades were never convincing paternalists; but in the same decades there developed between some Tortes and the crowd a more active, consenting alliance. Many small gentry, the victims of land tax and the losers in the consolidation of great estates against ffie small, hated the courtiers and the moneyed interest as aldently as did the plebs. And from this we see the consolidation of the specific traditions of Tory paternalism-for even in the nineteenth century, when we think of paternalism, it is Tory rather than Whig which we tend to couple with it. At its zenith, during the reigns of the first two Georges, this alliance achieved an ideological expression in the theatrical effects of popular Jacobitism.
By the fiffies this moment is passing, and wiffi the accession of George III we pass into a different climate. Certain kinds of conflict between Court and country had so far softened that it is possible to talk of the calcallated paternalist style of the gentry as a whole. In times of disturbance, in handling the crowd, one may now forget the distinction between Whig and Tory-at any rate at the level of the practicing J.P.-and one may see the magistracy as a whole as acting wiiin an established tradition. To maintain a hold over the poor they must show themselves to be neither papists nor puritarls. They must, at least in gestures, offer themselves as mediators During episodes of riot, most J.P.s of whatever persuasion, hung back from confrontation, preferred to intervene by moral suasion before summoning force. This stance flowed sometimes from an element of active sympathy for the crowd, especially where the gentry felt themselves to be aggneved at the profit which middlemen were making out of their own and their tenants' corn. A riot in Taunton in 1753 (Newcastle was informed) had been provoked by "one Burcher who has the town mills, & who instead of corn grinds the poor, in short he is generally thought to deserve punishment, in a legal wayn for malpractices of this kind.. .' Earl PoulettS the Lord Lieutenant of Somerset, clearly found men like Burcher to be a damned nuisance. They made work for him and for the bench; and, of eourse, order must be maintained A general "risingS' or state of riot brought other ill consequences m its train-the crowd became unmannerly the locus for disloyal speeches and seditious thoughts, 4'for they will all follow one another sooner than listen to gentlemen when they are once risen.> Indeed, on this occasion "at last some of them came to talk a levelling language, viz. they did not see whey some should be rich and others poor.' (There were even obscalre murmunngs about ad from France.)
But the maintenance of order was not a simple matter:
The The consequences feared were immediate ones: more damage to propertya more disorder, perhaps physical threats to the magistracy. Earl Poulett was clearly in two minds on the matter himself. He would, if so advised by your Grace '4get some of the principle Ring leaders convicted," but "t;he disposition of the town & neighbouring gentIemen (was) against it." There is in any case, neither here nor in hundreds of si!milar exchanges in 1740, 1753, 1756, the 1760s and later, any sense that the social order as a whole was endangered: what was feared was local ;'anarchy," the loss of prestige and hegemony in the localityn relaxing social discipline. It is usually assumed that the matter will, in the end, subside, and the degree of severity to be shown-whether a victim or two should or should not swing from the gallows-was a matter of calculated example and effect. We are back in a theater once more. Poulett apologized to Newcastle for troubling him with these "little disturbances." A Harwich fisherman giving a lewd Jacobite gesture had worried the King's ministers more than many hundreds of men and women marching about the country thirty years laterS demolishing mills arld seizlng grain. In such situations there was a practiced technique of crowd appeasement. The mob, Poulett wrote, It is a text worth examination. In the filrst place, it is difElcult to recall that it is the Pnme Minister of England who is writing, and to the "Home Secretary." What is being discussed appears to be the requisite style of private men of great property in dealing with an offense to their order: the Prime Minister is endeavonng to persuade "the few gentlemen that I have seen" to be more "active." In the second place, the incident illustrates superbly the supremacy of cultural over physical hegemony. Troops afford less security than the reassertion of paternalist authority. Above all, the credibility of the gentry and magistracy must be maintained. At an early stage in disturbance, the plebs should be persuaded above all to abandon an insubordinate posture, to couch their demands in legitimate and deferential terms: they should learn that they were likely to get more from a loyal petition than from a riot. But if the authorities failed to persuade the crowd to drop their bludgeons and await redress, then they were willing on occasion to negotiate with them under duress; but in such cases it became far more probable that the full and terrible theater of the Law would later perform its ghastly matinees in the troubled district. Punitive examples must be made, in order to re-establish the credibility of order. Then, once again, the cultural hegemony of the gentry would resume.
